Mit seinem epochalen Werk »Idee und Grundriß einer nicht-Aristotelischen Logik« (1959) legte Gotthard Günther (1900–1984) den Grundstein für eine radikal neue Form der philosophischen Betrachtung der ontologischen Einheit des Universums, deren Richtigkeit heute (auch unabhängig von Günther und in der Regel auf ungleich niedrigerem Niveau) von den Wissenschaften bestätigt wird (so z.B. in der Chaos-Forschung). Gegen die klassische (aristotelische) Logik, die nur zweiwertige Entscheidungen für verbindlich hält (eine Behauptung ist entweder wahr oder falsch), zeigt Günther auf, daß die – (...) mathematisch widerspruchsfrei formulierbare – mehrwertige Logik auch auf dem Gebiet der Ontologie, d.i. der Erfassung der Grundstrukturen des natürlichen Universums und des gesellschaftlichen Dialogs zwischen dem Ich und dem Du, Erkenntnismöglichkeiten eröffnet, die das Limit des klassischen Denkens rational überwinden. (shrink)

Recent claims, mainly from computer scientists, concerning a largely automated and model-free data-intensive science have been countered by critical reactions from a number of philosophers of science. The debate suffers from a lack of detail in two respects, regarding the actual methods used in data-intensive science and the specific ways in which these methods presuppose theoretical assumptions. I examine two widely-used algorithms, classificatory trees and non-parametric regression, and argue that these are theory-laden in an external sense, regarding the framing of (...) research questions, but not in an internal sense concerning the causal structure of the examined phenomenon. With respect to the novelty of data-intensive science, I draw an analogy to exploratory as opposed to theory-directed experimentation. (shrink)

Kant's theory of cognition centrally builds on his conception of self‐consciousness and the transcendental use of the phrase “I think”: the ability to add the phrase “I think” to a representation is a necessary condition of the ability to cognize objects. The paper argues that “I think”, rather than denoting the content of a predicative judgement, is typically an expression of the subject's thinking. It expresses a kind of self‐consciousness that, without assertively representing the subject itself, indicates that representational contents (...) are unified in a single consciousness of a single subject. Our aim is thus to develop and defend an expressivist interpretation of Kant's “I think”. (shrink)

Eine Einfiihrung in die epistemische Logik wurde schon vor unge fahr zwei Jahrzehnten durch Jaakko Hintikka geschrieben, und auf sein "Knowledge and Belief" nimmt das vorliegende Buch nicht nur durch den Titel "Glauben, Wissen und Wahrscheinlichkeit" Bezug. Es diirfte deshalb wohl angebracht sein, wenn der Autor eines Buches, das so deutlich die Nachfolgeschaft eines anderen beansprucht, sich dafiir rechtfertigt und erklart, worin sich sein Werk von dem des Vorgangers unterscheidet. Ein wichtiger Punkt, in dem die zweite iiber die erste Einleitung (...) in die epistemische Logik hinausgeht, wird schon durch die Titel erganzung "... und Wahrscheinlichkeit" signalisiert. Wahrend Hin tikkas erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchungen sich fast ausschlieB lich auf die Bestimmung einer Wissenslogik ("episteme") konzen trierten, werden hier unter Bezugnahme auf die Theorie subjektiver Wahrscheinlichkeit zusatzlich diverse Glaubenslogiken ("doxa") ent wickelt. Insbesondere wird ein Begriff "schwachen" Glaubens im Sinne des Fiir-wahrscheinlich-Haltens vom "starken" Glaubensbe griff im Sinne festester Oberzeugungen abgegrenzt, eine Unterschei dung, die im angelsachsischen Sprachraum bei der Diskussion der Logik von "belief" straflich vernachlassigt wurde. Die genaue Aus arbeitung dieses Unterschieds, die exakte semantische Charakteri sierung der entsprechenden doxastischen Modaloperatoren, und die Suche nach vollstandigen Axiomatisierungen korrespondierender Logiken fiihrte dabei in (mathematisches) Neuland: zur Theorie klassifikatorischer Wahrscheinlichkeit. Diese erste wesentliche Wei terentwicklung von "Knowledge and Belief" konnte man durch die Formel beschreiben: von rein epistemischer Logik hin zu epistemi scher und doxastischer Logik. (shrink)

According to the transparency approach, achievement of self-knowledge is a two-stage process: first, the subject arrives at the judgment ‘p’; second, the subject proceeds to the judgment ‘I believe that p.’ The puzzle of transparency is to understand why the transition from the first to the second judgment is rationally permissible. After revisiting the debate between Byrne and Boyle on this matter, I present a novel solution according to which the transition is rationally permissible in virtue of a justifying argument (...) that begins from a premise referring to the mental utterance that is emitted in the course of judging ‘p.’. (shrink)

Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascriptions enjoy a certain kind of authority that other-ascriptions lack (the Authority Thesis). The aim of this paper is not to expand the stock of existing explanations but to ask whether the Authority Thesis can be adequately specified. To this end, I identify three requirements that must be met by any satisfactory specification. I conclude that the search for an adequate specification of the Authority Thesis leads to (...) a dilemma: it either yields an interpretation under which the thesis is philosophically interesting but false, or it produces an interpretation under which the thesis is actually true but of minor philosophical interest. (shrink)

Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence (...) of this presence. (shrink)

Sections 1, 2 and 3 contain the main result, the strong finite axiomatizability of all 2-valued matrices. Since non-strongly finitely axiomatizable 3-element matrices are easily constructed the result reveals once again the gap between 2-valued and multiple-valued logic. Sec. 2 deals with the basic cases which include the important F i from Post's classification. The procedure in Sec. 3 reduces the general problem to these cases. Sec. 4 is a study of basic algebraic properties of 2-element algebras. In particular, we (...) show that equational completeness is equivalent to the Stone-property and that each 2-element algebra generates a minimal quasivariety. The results of Sec. 4 will be applied in Sec. 5 to maximality questions and to a matrix free characterization of 2-valued consequences in the lattice of structural consequences in any language. Sec. 6 takes a look at related axiomatization. problems for finite algebras and matrices. We study the notion of a propositional consequence with equality and, among other things, present explicit axiomatizations of 2-valued consequences with equality. (shrink)

It is widely held that if an object a is identical (or non-identical) to an object b, then it is necessary that a is identical (non-identical) to b. This view is supported an argument from Leibniz's Law and a popular conception of de re modality. On the other hand, there are good reasons to allow for contingent identity. Various alternative accounts of de re modality have been developed to achieve this kind of generality, and to explain what is wrong with (...) the argument from Leibniz's Law. (shrink)

Research Integrity (RI) is high on the agenda of both institutions and science policy. The European Union as well as national ministries of science have launched ambitious initiatives to combat misconduct and breaches of research integrity. Often, such initiatives entail attempts to regulate scientific behavior through guidelines that institutions and academic communities can use to more easily identify and deal with cases of misconduct. Rather than framing misconduct as a result of an information deficit, we instead conceptualize Questionable Research Practices (...) (QRPs) as attempts by researchers to reconcile epistemic and social forms of uncertainty in knowledge production. Drawing on previous literature, we define epistemic uncertainty as the inherent intellectual unpredictability of scientific inquiry, while social uncertainty arises from the human-made conditions for scientific work. Our core argument—developed on the basis of 30 focus group interviews with researchers across different fields and European countries—is that breaches of research integrity can be understood as attempts to loosen overly tight coupling between the two forms of uncertainty. Our analytical approach is not meant to relativize or excuse misconduct, but rather to offer a more fine-grained perspective on what exactly it is that researchers want to accomplish by engaging in it. Based on the analysis, we conclude by proposing some concrete ways in which institutions and academic communities could try to reconcile epistemic and social uncertainties on a more collective level, thereby reducing incentives for researchers to engage in misconduct. (shrink)

The present essay seeks, by way of the Austrian example, to make a contribution to what might be called the philosophy of the supranational state. More specifically, we shall attempt to use certain ideas on the philosophy of Gestalten as a basis for understanding some aspects of that political and cultural phenomenon which was variously called the Austrian Empire, the Habsburg Empire, the Danube Monarchy or Kakanien.

The paper explores the disjunctive riddle for induction: If we know the sample Ks to be P, we also know that they are P or F. Assuming that we also know that the future Ks are non-P, we can conclude that they are F, if only we can inductively infer the evidentially supported P-or-F hypothesis. Yet this is absurd. We cannot predict that future Ks are F based on the knowledge that the samples, and only they, are P. The ensuing (...) challenge is to account for the unprojectibility of the disjunctive hypothesis. I provide an explanation in terms of epistemic dependence. The P-or-F hypothesis is unprojectible because the evidence supporting it depends epistemically on the evidence for the defeated P-hypothesis. The paper also shows that the disjunctive riddle covers the essence of Goodman's infamous grue-problem, which, therefore, can be resolved by the same means: In contrast to the green-hypothesis, the grue-hypothesis is unprojectible because the grue-evidence depends on the evidence for a defeated hypothesis. (shrink)

Analogical reasoning addresses the question how evidence from various phenomena can be combined and made relevant for theory development and prediction. In the first part of my contribution, I review some influential accounts of analogical reasoning, both historical and contemporary, focusing in particular on Keynes, Carnap, Hesse, and more recently Bartha. In the second part, I sketch a general framework. To this purpose, a distinction between a predictive and a conceptual type of analogical reasoning is introduced. I then take up (...) a common intuition according to which analogical inferences hold if the differences between source and target concern only irrelevant circumstances. I attempt to make this idea more precise by addressing possible objections and in particular by specifying a notion of causal irrelevance based on difference making in homogeneous contexts. (shrink)

This paper scrutinizes Everett Nelson's conception of consistency by comparing it with the “standard” account of C. I. Lewis. This conflict surprisingly resembles a related controversy between the ancient logicians Chrysippus and Diodorus. Nelson's intuitions behind his peculiar conception of consistency are analysed and certain features of his logical system are critically examined. In particular, his objections against the law of the transitivity of implication and against the laws of conjunction and disjunction have to be discussed. Although Nelson's considerations contain (...) interesting ideas in favour of a relevantist conception of logic, they fail to convincingly support the hardcore connexive thesis that even a selfcontradictory proposition doesn't entail its own negation. (shrink)

Anti-reductionist philosophers have often argued that mental and linguistic phenomena contain an intrinsically normative element that cannot be captured by the natural sciences which focus on causal rather than rational relations. This line of reasoning raises the questions of how reasons could evolve in a world of causes and how children can be acculturated to participate in rule-governed social practices. In this paper I will sketch a Wittgensteinian answer to these questions. I will first point out that throughout his later (...) philosophy Wittgenstein draws a sharp distinction between "teaching" and "training": newly-born children are trained (conditioned) to react to specific stimuli in specific ways, which then allows them to acquire concepts and follow rules. I will then show that this picture presupposes a strong analogy between concepts and capacities, which is also present in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. In the last section I will point out that Wittgenstein only discusses the ontogenetic question of how individual children can acquire speech, but not the phylogenetic question of how rule-governed behavior could evolve in the first place. I will argue that this strategy should not be seen as a shortcoming, but rather as an expression of Wittgenstein's approach that can be characterized as naturalistic in a wide sense. (shrink)

In a notoriously obscure passage in Metaphysics 7.1 Aristotle claims that substance is primary in time. The only concrete literal interpretation suggested so far of this controversial claim is in terms of existing before and after in time. I argue that this interpretation faces serious problems. I then present a novel literal interpretation, in terms of being an appropriate subject of temporal predications, that is immune to these problems and strongly supported by philosophical and contextual considerations.

If an agent can't live up to the demands of ideal rationality, fallback norms come into play that take into account the agent's limitations. A familiar human limitation is our tendency to lose information. How should we compensate for this tendency? The Seeping Beauty problem allows us to isolate this question, without the confounding influence of other human limitations. If the coin lands tails, Beauty can't preserve whatever information she has received on Monday: she is bound to violate the norms (...) of ideal diachronic rationality. The considerations that support these norms, however, can still be used. I investigate how Beauty should update her beliefs so as to maximize the expected accuracy of her new beliefs. The investigation draws attention to important but neglected questions about the connection between rational belief and evidential support, about the status of ideal and non‐ideal norms, about the dependence of epistemic norms on descriptive facts, and about the precise formulation of expected accuracy measures. It also sheds light on the puzzle of higher‐order evidence. (shrink)

An infinite binary sequence X is Kolmogorov–Loveland random if there is no computable non-monotonic betting strategy that succeeds on X in the sense of having an unbounded gain in the limit while betting successively on bits of X. A sequence X is KL-stochastic if there is no computable non-monotonic selection rule that selects from X an infinite, biased sequence.One of the major open problems in the field of effective randomness is whether Martin-Löf randomness is the same as KL-randomness. Our first (...) main result states that KL-random sequences are close to Martin-Löf random sequences in so far as every KL-random sequence has arbitrarily dense subsequences that are Martin-Löf random. A key lemma in the proof of this result is that for every effective split of a KL-random sequence at least one of the halves is Martin-Löf random. However, this splitting property does not characterize KL-randomness; we construct a sequence that is not even computably random such that every effective split yields two subsequences that are 2-random. Furthermore, we show for any KL-random sequence A that is computable in the halting problem that, first, for any effective split of A both halves are Martin-Löf random and, second, for any computable, nondecreasing, and unbounded function g and almost all n, the prefix of A of length n has prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity at least n−g. Again, the latter property does not characterize KL-randomness, even when restricted to left-r.e. sequences; we construct a left-r.e. sequence that has this property but is not KL-stochastic and, in fact, is not even Mises–Wald–Church stochastic.Turning our attention to KL-stochasticity, we construct a non-empty class of KL-stochastic sequences that are not weakly 1-random; by the usual basis theorems we obtain such sequences that in addition are left-r.e., are low, or are of hyperimmune-free degree.Our second main result asserts that every KL-stochastic sequence has effective dimension 1, or equivalently, a sequence cannot be KL-stochastic if it has infinitely many prefixes that can be compressed by a factor of α<1. This improves on a result by Muchnik, who has shown that were they to exist, such compressible prefixes could not be found effectively. (shrink)

"Self-knowledge" refers to the knowledge a person has about their current mental states. Philosophically, this type of knowledge is intriguing because it appears to be acquired not only through a distinctive process, differing from other forms of empirical knowledge acquisition, but also in a particularly reliable manner. Thus, when I articulate my self-knowledge, I seem to speak with a unique first-person authority. My listeners appear to attribute greater weight to what I say about my own mental states than to what (...) others say about them. As is often the case in philosophical debates, nearly every aspect of this topic is contentious: not only what constitutes the best explanation for the distinctive features of self-knowledge but also whether self-knowledge actually possesses these features at all. This article provides an overview of the most important points of contention. (shrink)

Abstract: Brentano’s conception of scientific philosophy had a strong influence on his students and on the intellectual atmosphere of Vienna in the late nineteenth century. The aim of this article is to expose Brentano’s conception and to contrast his views with that of two traditions he is said to have considerably influenced: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. I will shed light on the question of how and to what extent Brentano’s conception of philosophy as a rigorous science has had an impact (...) on these two traditions. The discussion will show that both took their liberties in the interpretation of the thesis, a move that allowed them to liberate themselves from Brentano’s inheritance and to fully develop their own philosophical positions. (shrink)

The creation of new institutions and the initiation of new forms of behaviour cannot be explained only on the basis of constitutive rules – they also require a broader commitment of individuals who participate in social practices and, thus, to become members of a community. In this paper, I argue that the received conception of constitutive rules shows a problematic intellectualistic bias that becomes particularly manifest in three assumptions: (i) constitutive rules have a logical form, (ii) constitutive rules have no (...) normative force, and (iii) rules are essentially tied to a sanctioning authority. I discuss these three claims in light of real-life examples. The goal of this discussion is to show that the normative force of constitutive rules is based on the shared commitment of participants who engage in the relevant practices. The inner cohesion and the persistence in time of these practices is possible only because participants continuously calibrate their own forms of behaviour to that of the other members of the community, which underscores the social dimension of constitution. (shrink)

I argue that none of the usual interpretations of probability provide an adequate interpretation of probabilistic theories in science. Assuming that the aim of such theories is to capture noisy relationships in the world, I suggest that we do not have to give them classical truth-conditional content at all: their probabilities can remain uninterpreted. Indirectly, this account turns out to explain what is right about the frequency interpretation, the best-systems interpretation, and the epistemic interpretation.

Leibniz's development of a "calculus universalis" stands and falls with his theory of negation. During the entire period of the elaboration of the algebra of concepts, L1, Leibniz had to struggle hard to grasp the difference between propositional and conceptual negation. Within the framework of syllogistic, this difference seems to disappear because 'Omne A non B' may be taken to be equivalent to ‘Omne A est non-B’. Within the "universal calculus", however, the informal quantifier expression 'omne' is to be dropped. (...) Accordingly, ‘A non est B' expresses only the propositional negation of ‘A est B' and is hence logically weaker than ‘A est non-B'. Besides Leibniz's cardinal error of confusing propositional and conceptual negation the following issues are dealt with in this paper: -"Aristotelian" vs. "Scholastic" Syllogistic; – Metalinguistic theory of the truth-predicate; -Individual-concepts vs. concepts in general. (shrink)

This volume consists of essays from a colloquium about "philosophy of economics" held at the·University of l1unich in July, 1981. They are contributions to an enterprise which in some respects is long-standing and in other respects is new. The long-standing enterprise is to somehow establish decision theory and its kindred disciplines as the basis of economic theory from which its other parts might be shown to follow. The new enterprise is to apply (some of) the latest methods of phi. losophy (...) of science to economic theory. By "philosophy of science" we do not mean h:istory of science and the like; rather we mean a reconstructive proce dure which clarifies and deepens the understanding of the science under investigation. By "the latest methods" we refer to the structuralist view which has emerged in the last fifteen years, and which has been success fully applied most notably to physical theories. Economics being rather like a stepchild of a reconstructivist philo sophy of science, we think much of the interest of this volume to lie just in its attending to the newer enterprise_ We are happy to have brought together at the colloquium some of the few philosophers of scien ce working in. this field who share this common goal, and we hope that their essays will stimulate further work. -The contributions to the long-standing enterprise, though perhaps not as urgent, are no less valuable. (shrink)

The Dialectica-style functional interpretation of Kripke-Platek set theory with infinity ( $\hbox{\sf KP} \omega$ ) given in [1] uses a choice functional (which is not a definable set function of ( $hbox{\sf KP} \omega$ ). By means of a Diller-Nahm-style interpretation (cf. [4]) it is possible to eliminate the choice functional and give an interpretation by set functionals primitive recursive in $x\mapsto\omega$ . This yields the following characterization: The class of $\Sigma$ -definable set functions of $\hbox{\sf KP} \omega$ coincides with (...) the collection of set functionals of type 1 primitive recursive in $x\mapsto \omega$. (shrink)

In “Lectio 55” of his Notule libri Priorum, Robert Kilwardby discussed various objections that had been raised against Aristotle’s Theses. The first thesis, AT1, says that no proposition q is implied both by a proposition p and by its negation, ∼p. AT2 says that no proposition p is implied by its own negation. In Prior Analytics, Aristotle had shown that AT2 entails AT1, and he argued that the assumption of a proposition p such that (∼p → p) would be “absurd”. (...) The unrestricted validity of AT1, AT2, however, is at odds with other principles which were widely accepted by medieval logicians, namely the law Ex Impossibili Quodlibet, EIQ, and the rules of disjunction introduction. Since, according to EIQ, the impossible proposition (p ∧ ∼p) implies every proposition, it also implies ∼(p∧∼p), in contradiction to AT2. Furthermore, by way of disjunction introduction, the proposition (p∨∼p) is implied both by p and by ∼p, in contradiction to AT1. Kilwardby tried to defend AT1, AT2 against these objections by claiming that EIQ holds only for accidental but not for natural implications. The second argument, however, cannot be refuted in this way because Kilwardby had to admit that every disjunction (p ∨ q) is naturally implied by its disjuncts. He therefore introduced the further requirement that, in order to constitute a genuine counterexample to AT1, (p → q) and (∼p → q) have to hold “by virtue of the same thing”. In a recently published paper, Spencer Johnston accepted this futile defence of AT1 and developed a formal semantics that would fit Kilwardby’s presumably connexive implication. This procedure, however, is misguided because the remaining considerations of Lesson 55  which were entirely ignored by Johnston  show that Kilwardby eventually recognized that AT2 is bound to fail. After all he concluded: “So it should be granted that from the impossible its opposite follows, and that the necessary follows from its opposite”. (shrink)

Dieses Buch geht davon aus, dass eine moderne Hermeneutik als Theorie des Verstehens im begrifflichen Rahmen der gegenwärtigen Theorie des Geistes und der Semantik rekonstruiert werden sollte. Vor diesem theoretischen Hintergrund, der in einem eigenen Kapitel näher umrissen wird, soll die Geschichte der Hermeneutik neu gelesen werden. Dabei wird deutlich, dass diese Lesart vielfach neue historische Interpretationen zu entwickeln und die wichtigsten Stationen der Geschichte der Hermeneutik theoretisch auf neue Weise zu integrieren vermag. Über die hermeneutischen Positionen hinaus, die in (...) den bisherigen Gesamtdarstellungen auftauchen, werden auch Entwürfe diskutiert, die besonders unter geist-theoretischen Aspekten interessant sind, zum Beispiel die antike Hermeneutik, die Hermeneutik Max Webers, die Hermeneutik der logischen Empiristen und die naturalistische Hermeneutik. Vor allem aber wird belegt, dass die Geschichte der Hermeneutik teilweise zu großen Einsichten gelangt ist, an die eine moderne Hermeneutik anknüpfen kann. Das Buch wendet sich nicht nur an Spezialisten der Hermeneutik-Geschichte, sondern an alle Interessierten, denen das Schicksal der verstehenden Wissenschaften am Herzen liegt, und möchte ihnen eine Perspektive empfehlen, unter der sich der Status und die Autonomie der Geisteswissenschaften sowie ihr Bezug auf das Humane unter Heranziehung substantieller Theorien auf neue Weise würdigen lassen. (shrink)

Traditional logic as a part of philosophy is one of the oldest scientific disciplines. Mathematical logic, however, is a relatively young discipline and arose from the endeavors of Peano, Frege, Russell and others to create a logistic foundation for mathematics. It steadily developed during the 20th century into a broad discipline with several sub-areas and numerous applications in mathematics, informatics, linguistics and philosophy. While there are already several well-known textbooks on mathematical logic, this book is unique in that it is (...) much more concise than most others, and the material is treated in a streamlined fashion which allows the professor to cover many important topics in a one semester course. Although the book is intended for use as a graduate text, the first three chapters could be understood by undergraduates interested in mathematical logic. These initial chapters cover just the material for an introductory course on mathematical logic combined with the necessary material from set theory. This material is of a descriptive nature, providing a view towards decision problems, automated theorem proving, non-standard models and other subjects. The remaining chapters contain material on logic programming for computer scientists, model theory, recursion theory, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems, and applications of mathematical logic. Philosophical and foundational problems of mathematics are discussed throughout the text. The author has provided exercises for each chapter, as well as hints to selected exercises. About the German edition: …The book can be useful to the student and lecturer who prepares a mathematical logic course at the university. What a pity that the book is not written in a universal scientific language which mankind has not yet created. - A.Nabebin, Zentralblatt. (shrink)

A difference-making account of causality is proposed that is based on a counterfactual definition, but differs from traditional counterfactual approaches to causation in a number of crucial respects: it introduces a notion of causal irrelevance; it evaluates the truth-value of counterfactual statements in terms of difference-making; it renders causal statements background-dependent. On the basis of the fundamental notions 'causal relevance' and 'causal irrelevance', further causal concepts are defined including causal factors, alternative causes, and importantly inus-conditions. Problems and advantages of the (...) proposed account are discussed. Finally, it is shown how the account can shed new light on three classic problems in epistemology, the problem of induction, the logic of analogy, and the framing of eliminative induction. (shrink)

Modal accounts of knowledge, mind, and language, as prominently defended by Lewis, leave no room for enquiry into non-contingent matters. According to Lewis, there is only one necessarily true proposition, and it is vacuously known by everyone. What, then, are we doing when we do metaphysics, which often seems to deal with non-contingent questions? Lewis never gave a satisfactory answer, or even acknowledged the problem. I explore some options. Can we understand the relevant parts of metaphysics as dealing with contingent (...) questions about our concepts? Can we understand them in terms of a hyperintensional conception of “explicit” knowledge? Both options have some promise. Ultimately, however, I don’t think they succeed at squaring Lewis’s empiricist epistemology with his metaphysical realism. (shrink)

Through the work of philosophers like Sellars, Davidson and McDowell, the question of how the mind is related to the world has gained new importance in contemporary analytic philosophy. This book demonstrates that Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the structure of consciousness can provide fruitful insights for developing an original approach to these questions.

A systematic introduction into the mimetic theory of the French-American literary theorist and philosophical anthropologist René Girard, this essential text explains its three main pillars with the help of examples from literature and philosophy. This book also offers an overview of René Girard’s life and work, showing how much mimetic theory results from existential and spiritual insights into one’s own mimetic entanglements. Furthermore it examines the broader implications of Girard’s theories, from the mimetic aspect of sovereignty and wars to the (...) relationship between the scapegoat mechanism and the question of capital punishment. Mimetic theory is placed within the context of current cultural and political debates like the relationship between religion and modernity, terrorism, the death penalty, and gender issues. Drawing textual examples from European literature and philosophy, Palaver uses mimetic theory to explore the themes they present. A highly accessible book, this text is complemented by bibliographical references to Girard’s widespread work and secondary literature on mimetic theory and its applications, comprising a valuable bibliographical archive that provides the reader with an overview of the development and discussion of mimetic theory until the present day. (shrink)

Over recent years, science and technology have been reassessed increasingly in ethical terms. Particularly for life science governance, ethics has become the dominant discourse. In the course of this ‘‘ethical turn’’ national ethics councils were set up throughout Europe and in the United States to advice politics in ethically controversial issues such as stem cell research and genetic testing. Ethics experts have become subject to traditional warnings against expertocracy: they are suspected to unduly influence political decision-making. However, any reliable ethics (...) expertise has to reflect societal disagreements in moral issues. Therefore, expert dissent is a normal feature of legitimate ethics expertise. Based on theoretical considerations we argue that in principle, expert dissent does not cause problems for political legitimacy; rather, it enhances the salience of politics: obviously decisions on ethical issues cannot be taken on the basis of expert knowledge alone. We therefore conclude that expert dissent, not consent, supports politics. Focussing on Germany and Austria, we show how politics deal with expert dissent in practice. While in Germany politics acknowledge dissent and use it to foster a fundamental political debate, Austrian politics attribute authoritative power to ethics expertise and try to construct an overall consensus. This illustrates how the drawing of boundaries between politic and expertise differs. (shrink)